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IS A CONTRACT NECESSARY TO CREATE AN EFFECTIVE ESCROW?

W

HERE land has been sold and both parties are desirous of
protecting themselves pending full payment of the purchase price, there are two common ways of accomplishing their purpose without any change in legal ownership. There
may be (I) a contract of sale properly evidenced so as to be enforceable, and (2) a deed executed by the vendor and placed "in
escrow."*" Sometimes one method is preferred, sometimes the
other.' If the former is adopted, it is, of course, vitally important
that the contract comply with the formal requirements of the law;
in the latter there has been some difference of opinion as to the necessity for such contract. Quite a number of courts and text writers in this country have held or said that a binding, effective escrow
necessitates a contract pursuant to which the instrument is deposited.2 A few courts have held that not only must there be a conI This expression which is commonly used in cases and books will be used in this
paper. It is realized of course that a deed is not deposited in escrow, that what really
happens is that an instrument il writing is deposited with a custodian as an escrow.
'It may be stated here that whichever method is adopted, the rights of the parties
as against intervening third parties claiming through or under the vendor are the same.
If the parties have adopted the contract method, questions of priority, etc., would be
worked out by application of the familiar equitable principles; if, on the other hand. a
deed has been made and placed in escrow, such questions would be solved in the terms
of relation back. "To some purposes" says Sheppard's Touchstone, p. 59, "it hath relation to the time of the first delivery and to some purposes not." This illuminating statement affords as much assistance as does another familiar saying that there will be relation
back "when justice'demands it", otherwise not. See "Conditional Deliveries of Deeds
of Land" by Professor Harry A. Bigelow, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 565, and "Conditional Deliv.
ery of Deeds" by Professor Herbert T. Tiffany, 14 Col. L. Rev. 389. In general, as to
the position of the intervening third party I agree with the results arrived at by Professor
Bizelow. I cannot, however, aaren with his reasoning in arriving at such results. As
pointed out in this paper the operation of an escrow in its effect upon ownership cannot
be considered as a "legal short cut" for specific performance.
2 See the cas-s referred to infra.
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tract but it must be enforceable. It is the purpose of this paper to
examine into the soundness of these doctrines.
First, as to the requirement that there be a legally enforceable
contract. This doctrine seems to have been first expressed by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, in 1877, in Campbell v. Thomas.3 In
that case there had been a parol contract of sale of certain lands
pursuant to which the vendee had paid a small sum to apply on the
purchase price and the vendor had deposited a deed with a third
party with instructions to deliver same to the vendee, the grantee
therein, upon making deposit of notes and mortgage and payment
of a further sum in- cash. The grantee having performed according to the agreement, and the grantor having directed the depositary to refuse to hand over the deed, suit was brought against the
grantor and custodian to compel the delivery of the deed. It was
held, reversing the trial court, that as there was no contract satisfying the statute of frauds there was, consequently, no effective
escrow, the deed being subject to the grantor's control, and no action could be based on the contract. In support of the first proposition, that without a valid contract antecedent to the deposit of the
instrument the deed was within the grantor's control, the court cited only Fitch v. Bunch,4 which will be referred to later. A rehearing
was granted and further opinions rendered. IR. JusTicE LYoN
said:
"Because such deposit did not divest the plaintiff of his
title to the land, there is no executed contract of sale; and
hence, it seems almost too plain to be questioned or doubted
that, before the plaintiff can obtain the delivery of the deed
and the title to the land, after the defendant has recalled the
deed and repudiated the whole transaction, he must show
that the defendant has made a valid and binding agreement
to sell and convey the land. And such an agreement can be
evidenced only by a written note or memorandum thereof,
expressing the consideration and subscribed by the defendant. * * * But we have not discovered a single case in
which it has been held that one who has deposited a deed of
land with a third person with directions to deliver it to the
grantee on the happening of a given event, but who has made
no valid executory contract to convey the land, may not revoke the directions to the depositary and recall the deed at
any time before the conditions of the deposit have been
342 Wis. 437, 24

'3o

Am. Rep.

Cal. 2o8 (x866).

427.
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complied with; provided that those conditions are such that
the title does not pass at once to the grantee upon the delivery of the deed to the depositary."

And RYAi, C. J., said:
"I have no doubt that an escrow may be proved by parol.
The difficulty here is not in the proof of the alleged escrow,
but in the proof of the contract of sale and purchase itself.
When there is a valid contract under the statute, the papers
constituting it, or executed in compliance with it, may be delivered in escrow, and the escrow may be proved by parol.
But the validity of the escrow rests on the validity of the contract; and the validity of the contract rests on the statute." 5
The doctrine of Campbell v. Thomas was expressly approved and
followed by the Supreme Court of Indiana in 1881 in Freeland v.
Charnley.6 The court there held that an escrow is a mere paper
with characters thereon until delivered to the grantee upon or after
the performance of the conditions, 7 and in the absence of an enforceable contract of sale may be withdrawn by the grantor at any
time before performance. The court said:
"It is clear to our mind that a deed placed in the hands of
a depositary, with instructions to deliver it upon the performance of a designated condition by the grantee, may be
recalled before performance. Until the grantee has in some
manner assented to such deposit, there cannot be the semblance of a delivery, for every delivery implies an acceptance. Of course, if there is, back of the deposit of the deed,
an enforceable contract, relief might be had; but in such a
case the deposit of the deed would not supply the right of
IIt is more than merely interesting to observe that Wisconsin is one of those states
in which an oral contract for the sale of land is not only unenforceable under the familiar
statute providing that "no action shall be brought, etc.," but it is positively declared by
the statute (Wis. Stat. 1898, C. 104) to be void. In Campbell v. Thomas, then, there
not only was no enforceable contract but there was no contract at all. This distinction
may be of no little importance. As will appear later on, where there is no contract at
all between the grantor and grantee it is much easier for a court to hold that the grantor
has not completely yielded up control of the instrument than where there is a contract
even though it be unenforceable. That in Wisconsin such oral contract is really void,
see Koch-v. Williams. 82 Wis. 186 (1892). A very nice instance of a contract unenforceable by action but effective for another vurpose is the very late case in the House
of Lords of Morris v. Baron & Co., (Oct. 19, 1917), 87 L. J. P. (K. B.) 145.
' 80 Ind. 132 (1881).
' The Indiana court placed great reliance upon the old-fashioned notion that the deed
is inoperative as a conveyance until actually delivered by the custodian to the grantee.
How much influence this requirement of a formal delivery to the grantee had upon the
court in arriving at its conclusion iq. of course, impoqsible to say. See infra, note 33.
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action-that would be supplied by the executory contract.
In the case at bar the deed was recalled before the performalice of the condition, and there was no enforceable executory contract. Without such a contract there is no cause of
action."
In Main v. Pratt9 the Wisconsin doctrine was adopted in Illinois,
it being there held that since the contract of sale was oral the deed
deposited in escrow pursuant thereto was rendered wholly ineffective by the grantor's death. The court said (p. 224) :
"The delivery of the deed by Mrs. Finn and of the note
by Pratt to Hoss was in pursuance of and a part of a parol
contract between the parties for the sale by the grantor to the
grantee of the land. Whether or not they lost control over
the respective instruments deposited with Hoss depends upon the validity or enforceability of the contract and not solely upon the intention of the parties, as contended by appellant. The parol contract for the sale of the land clearly
came within the operation of the Statute of Frauds and was
unenforceable. Neither party could have compelled the other
to carry out its provisions or terms during the lifetime of
Mrs. Finn, and it follows, such being the case, either party
could have repudiated the contract at will before the conditions upon which it was to be delivered to the grantee had
been performed. This being so, the contract, whether revoked by the death of Mrs. Finn or not, was no more binding upon and enforceable against her sole heir than it was
against Mrs. Finn in her lifetime."
The court cited only C7ampbell v. Thomas and Kopp v. Reiter'°
wherein the Campbell case had been referred to approvingly.
During 1917 the Oregon court, in Foulkes v. Sengstacken,", and
the Washington Court, in McLain v. Heay,12 decided that a binding deposit in escrow necessitated an enforceable contract pursuant
to which the deposit is made. In the Oregon case the court points
out that without such contract there was only a continuing offer
which necessarily terminated with the death of the offerer. Both
S In McCasland v. The Aetna Life Ins. Co., io8 Ind. r30 (1886), the court said that
"Where a promise is so far executed that a deed is delivered under it conditionally, it
is taken out of the statute of frauds when the condition is fully performed, for, upon the
performance of the condition, the deed becomes effective and the grantee is entitled to it."
*276 Ill. 2r8 (gr6).
'0 746 "Ill. 437 (1893).

2183 Ore. xiS.
12168 Pac. i.

CONTRACT NECESSARY TO AN ESCROW?
cases rest directly or indirectly upon the authority of Campbell v.
Thomas and a group of cases, of which Fitch v. Bunch, supra, is a
prominent example, to be referred to presently.
These five jurisdictions, it is believed, are the only ones in which
there have been definite, authoritative rulings that such an enforceable contract back of the escrow is essential to make the deposit irrevocable by the maker thereof." It is certainly interesting and
perhaps significant that the first one of these decisions was handed
down by a court in Wisconsin no longer ago than 1877, and that the
other cases rest directly or indirectly upon that adjudication.
Not infrequently courts1" and writers1 5 have cited in connection
with Campbell v. Thomas, apparently as rulings to the same effect,
another group of cases. Fitch v. Bunch, supra, is not only typical
of this class but has been quite largely relied upon by the cases
making up the group. In that case B and plaintiff's husband agreed
to exchange lands of plaintiff for some mining stock owned by B.
Plaintiff, with her husband, made out a deed of the land and deposited it with N with whom the stock was also left. The arrangement was further that the husband and B should visit the mine,
and then, if they were satisfied, orders were to be issued to N to
deliver the stock and deed. After the inspection directions were
given by the husband and B to N to deliver, but in the meantime
plaintiff had notified N that he was not to deliver the deed but to
return it to her. In an action by her to enjoin fuming the deed over
to B the court held the deed had never passed out of her control
and therefore she could recall same. After pointing out that deliveries of deeds may be either absolute or conditional, the court said:
"Every act necessary to be performed by either party to
the deed, in order that the present title may pass to the
grantee, must also be performed, in case of an escrow, except only the delivery of the deed to the grantee. An escrow
differs from a deed in one particular only, and that is the delivery. In all other requisites, they are the same. Not only
must there be sufficient parties, a proper subject matter and
a consideration, but the parties must have actually contracted. When the instrument purports to be a conveyance of
land, the grantor must have sold, and the grantee must have
uThe same doctrine is laid down in Seifert v. Lanz, (N. D.) iSo N. W. 568 (9igS).
The court, however, found that there was an enforceable contract.
"See Nichols v. Oppermann, 6 Wash. 68 (0893);Clark v. Campbell, 23 Ut. 569
(igoi); Davis v. Brigham, 56 Ore. 41 (igro); Seifert v. Lanz, (N. D.) i.o N. W. 568
(1gs).
Am. & Eng. Enc. Lw (2nd ed.) 335; 1o Ruling Case Law 622.
"i1

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

purchased the land. A proposal to sell, or a proposal to
buy, though stated in writing, will not be sufficient. The
minds of the parties must have met, the terms have been
agreed upon, and both must have assented to the instrument as a conveyance of the land, which the grantor would
then have delivered and the grantee received, except for the
agreement then made that it be delivered to a third person,
to be kept until some specified condition is performed by the
grantee, and thereupon to be delivered to him by such third
person. The actual contract of sale on the one side, and of
purchase on the other, is an essential to constitute the instrument in escrow, as that it be executed by the grantor; and
until both parties have definitely assented to the contract, the
instrument executed by the proposed grantor, though in
form of deed, is neither a deed nor an escrow; and it makes
no difference whether the instrument remains in the possession of the nominal grantor or is placed in the hands of a
third person, pending the proposals for sale or purchase."
As a further reason for the decision it was pointed out that the
instrument could not be said to have been delivered, in the sense in
which that term is used in defining an escrow, for it was to be held
subject to the order of the depositor; there were to be additional
directions before the deed should become operative.
This case, it is submitted, falls far short of a decision that an
effective deposit in escrow necessitates an enforceable contract. In
the first place, it is clear on the facts that there could not have been
an effective delivery, for something remained for the grantor to do
before the custodian would be authorized to make delivery, hence
there had been no complete yielding up of control which is so essential to a good delivery. Secondly, the court, in talking about a contract, quite evidently was not considering this as essential so that
an action might be brought thereon, but to establish that no further
negotiations were contemplated; that all that remained to make the
instrument an operative deed was the performance of the condition; that, in short, the maker had no further right to control the
disposition of the instrument.
The view of the California court as to this situation is further
shown by the decision in Cannon v. Handley.16 There an instrument
was deposited "in escrow" pursuant to an oral contract of sale. Later and before the condition was performed by the vendee, the vendor sought to call off the transaction and withdraw the deed. The
2' 72

Cal. 133 (1887).
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vendee, however, went on and tendered performance. The court
held he was entitled to the premises, and ordered a deed thereof
1
to be made by the grantee to whom the vendor had conveyed.
Fitch v. Bunch was followed by the same court in Miller v. Sears"
and Holland v. McCarthy,"9 in neither of which had there been any
contract oral or written, the court again emphasized the fact that
the depositor still had a right to control the instrument.
The Fitch case was one of the few cases cited by the Wisconsin
court in Campbell v. Thomas as supporting the doctrine there announced, that an enforceable contract is a necessity for a binding
The other cases cited merely laid down the
deposit in escrow.
there can be no delivery so long as the dethat
familiar principle
positor may revoke or recall the instrument. Fitch v. Bunch really
The court considered that in this case there was a contract "certain in all its parts,
'IT
partly executed and performed by delivery of the property sold, and a deed perfect in
every respect executed by the grantors to the vendee, and placed in the hands of defendant
Cox, to be delivered by Cox to plaintiff on the payment of the purchase money.
The deed was delivered as an escrow to Cox, and he so held it. * * *
"We cannot concur in the view that Cox was the mere agent of the vendors, and
held the paper as such, being bound to deliver the paper to the vendors when demanded
of him by them. He was to hold it, and deliver it to the vendee when the money was
paid: * * * The question is so clear that further discussion would darken instead of
elucidating it.
"The deed being then delivered as an escrow, it is no longer revocable by the vendor,
but it will take effect whenever the condition has happened or been complied with on
which it is to be delivered.* * * From this it would clearly follow that the grantor cannot recall the deed after the delivery as an escrow; and when the condition is complied
with by the grantee, he is absolutely entitled to it The Ohio Supreme Court in the case
of Shirley v. Ayres, above cited (14 Oh. 3o3). held that. inasmuch as the depositary of
the escrow was the agent of the grantee as well as grantor, the deed takes effect the
moment the condition is performed, without any formal delivery into the hands of the
grantee. In other words, it may be said, when the condition is performed, the depositary
becomes the custodian of the grantee, holding the deed for him, and this possession as
such custodian is the possession of the grantee. We think this rule is based on sound
principles, and should be upheld."
Later on in its opinion the court opens itself to question in disposing of a contention
by the defendant that no relief should be granted for the reason that the contract was
oral. The court, following Cagger v. Lansing, 57 Barb. 42!, held the deed a sufficient
note or memorandum to satisfy the statute of frauds.
If a deed delivered to a custodian pursuant to an oral agreement of sale is, as said
by the Indiana court in Freeland v. Charnley, supra, "no more than a mere piece of
paper covered with written or printed characters and possesses no more force than a
poem or an historical essay, locked in the desk of the person described as grantor," then
surely the court went too far. The court, however, had already declared, as quoted
above, that a deed delivered as an escrow is something decidedly more than a mere piece
of paper, etc.; it is, as to the grantor, a completed legal act, and beyond his control.
See also to same effect, Tharaldson v. Everts. 87 Minn. 168 (1902).
i 91 Cal. a82 (t89:). Here the question of title remained to be settled to the satisfaction of the contracting parties. "This fact alone is fatal to the contention of respondents that they held the documents in controversy as an escrow." The court then cites and
quotes from Fitch v. Bunch.
19173 Cal. 597 (1916). In this case Cannon v. Handley is distinguished on the
ground that here there was no contract at all.
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goes no furtherY° The Utah court in Clark v. Campbell,21 a case
in which palpably the maker of an instrument had not divested
himself of control, repeats the requirements of an effective escrow
announced in Fitch v. Bunch. The language of the court, however,
is taken from DEVIIN ON D]EDS 22 which in turn took it from the
case last referred to. The same doctrine in virtually the same
language taken from the same source is found also in the AmmICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW13 and in RULING CASE
2
LAW. ' The latter is the only "authority" aside from Campbell v.
Thomas, relied on in the very recent Washington case, McLain v.
Healy, above referred to as requiring an enforceable contract.
In addition to the cases already referred to the following have
been occasionally cited as to the same effect as Campbell v. Thomas;
Pattersonv. Underwood25 ; Wier v. Batdorf26 ; Hoig v. Adrian College27 ; Stanton v. Miner2-; Bosea v. Ient- ; Anderson v. Messen
ger 0 . For the proposition that a binding deposit in escrow necessitates a yielding up of all control of the instrument pending the performance of the conditions these cases may well be cited. But they
cannot be considered as rulings that an enforceable contract between
the parties is the only means by which such control may be,lost3 '.
0oObviously one of the best ways of showing that the parties had left nothing to
further negotiation, that the deal was closed, in other words, that there was nothing left
for the grantor to do which could be said to keep the deed within his control, is by proving a contract. Whether that is the only way in which complete divestiture of control
may be shown is questionable.
Perhaps the error in the California court's doctrine, if
it may be called that, is in speaking of the most common method of establishing lack of
control as the only method.
at23 Ut. 569 (1goz).
"Vol.
s, Sec. 313.
'3 Vol. 1, p. 335 (2nd ed.).
2Vol. 7o, p. 622.
29
Ind. 6o7 (1868).
'24
Neb. 83 (1888).
283 I11 267 (1876).
2' 58 N. Y. 192 (1874),
"44 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 437 (1903).
21 1S8 Fed. 25o (1907).
"1 In Patterson v. Underwood the owner of land had made out a deed thereof and
put it into the hands of one who had contracted to convey the premises to the grantee
named in the deed. The custodian having torn up the deed before his vendee had performed, it was held that the latter's remedy against the former was wholly based upon,
his contract which was unenforceable by reason of the statute of frauds.
In Wier v. Batdorf, it was simply held that inasmuch as the deed had been left
with the grantor's own agents who had no authority to receive the grantee's money or
deliver the deed there was no escrow.
Hoig v. Adrian College is referred to at length infra, p. 579.
Stanton v. Miller arose upon an action by the grantee in a deed to compel a custodian
with whom the instrument had been left and the heir of the grantor to deliver same to
plaintiff. The deed had been left with the depositary with the express understanding that
it might be recalled at any time. This was the real ground for the decision refusing the
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In the discussion of the main problem it may be helpful to consider these situations:
I. A contracts to sell and convey land to B in consideration of
$5,ooo. Pursuant to the agreement A makes out a deed and leaves
it with X with instructions to deliver to B when B shall have turned
over to X the purchase price. The contract is evidenced by writings
and is enforceable.
II. A makes out a deed to B and deposits it with X with instructions that in case B leaves $5,000 with X he shall deliver the instrument to B. There were no prior negotiations between A and B,
or if there were, no agreement had been reached.
III. Same as CAsE I, except that the contract between A and B
is oral, hence unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.
Let us suppose in each case that before B performs the condition A notified X that the deal is off and requests the return of the
deed; that B nevertheless performs or tenders performance; and
that B through litigation seeks to enforce his claim to the land.
Such litigation might take the shape of an action to compel the
execution of a deed pursuant to an alleged contract, an action to
compel the turning over of the deed as a muniment of B's title, or
perhaps under some circumstances, a bill to quiet title.
relief prayed for. The court, however, said: "The making of a deed in escrow presupposes a contract, pursuant to which the deposit is made; it implies an arrangement between the grantor and the party who is to perform the condition; and where the one has
agreed to convey when the condition is performed, and the other to perform the condition, and the deed has been placed in escrow, to carry out the purpose as defined in the
contract or arrangement between the parties, without any reservation, express or implied,
on the part of the grantor, when the deposit is made, of a right to recall the deed, then
the authorities are that the delivery cannot be revoked by the party making it, so long
as there is no breach by the other of the condition upon which it is made." Here there
is absolutely nothing said about an enforceable contract; in fact it is far from clear
that the court, even in this dictum, insists upon any contract, for they say, "Contract or
arrangement". Is it not clear that what the court had in mind was simply the familiar
proposition that nothing must remain to be done by the grantor, that the deed must have
passed beyond his control? The authorities cited by the court in this connection bear
out this veiw, they all stand for the doctrine that when a deed is deposited with a third
party, in order to amount to a delivery the grantor must have finished up his part of the
transaction and reserved no right to recall the deed or to control its course.
So in Bosea v. Lent, an inferior New York court merely repeated the doctrine of
Stanton v. Miller, above cited, in a case where it was concluded that the custodian was
acting merely as the agent of the grantor.
And in Anderson v Messenger the situation was the same, the court considering that
the deeds were left with the custodian not as escrows but so that they would be convenient to get. The court says, to be sure, that "to constitute an escrow there must be
a contract, which prevents the grantor from recalling the deed". As authorities for
this requirement the court cites James v. Vanderheyden, r Paige (N. Y.) 385; Cook v.
Brown, 34 N. H. 46o; Prutsman v. Baker, 30 Wis. 644, all of which are familiar cases
supporting the propositions that in order to have a delivery there must be a complete
divestiture of control over the instrument, or that nothing must remain to be done by
the grantor in order to make the instrument operative.
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The same problem in essence is presented briefly by the inquiry:
Is A in position to demand and compel X to return the deed? This
was the way the question got before the court in Fitch v. Bunch.
Clearly in CASE I it would be held that B should prevail, or,
in other words, that A could not insist upon the return of the deed
by X. All courts apparently would agree as to this situation. At
the moment performance by B is complete he becomes the legal
owner, and it would be immaterial that the deed remained, perhaps, in the possession of X. There is some difference of opinion as
to this, 32 but the sound view undoubtedly is to the effect that no

manual delivery from X to B is necessary. 83 To the demand of A
for the return of the deed it would seem entirely sufficient for X
to reply, "This instrument deposited with me by you was not left
in any sense subject to your order; upon his performance of the
conditions specified B, as I understand it, is to have this paper as
your deed, and only in case of his failure to comply with the terms
of the arrangement between you, am I to be considered as holding
it subject to your order."3 4
In CASE II it of course is obvious that B could not succeed on
any claim for specific performance, and it is unlikely that he could
succeed in any other form of action. Also it would seem that A
would be entitled to demand the return of the deed by X. A reply
as indicated above would hardly be sufficient under the facts of
CASE II. The essence of the transaction here would seem to be a
mere offer by A to B, revocable at any time by A, and the holding
by X therefore would be as an agent of A.
In Holland v. McCarthy35 the California court put it as
follows: "Here no right to revoke or recall was expressed as
a condition at the time the deed was handed to Julia McCara2 See, for instance, Frecland v. Charnley, supra.
"I "Some courts hold that an escrow does not take effect as a fully executed deed until
there has been a rightful delivery to the grantee; but the logical position approved in a
number of authorities is that it is effective as a deed when the grantor relinquishes
the possession and control of it by delivery to the depositary, and it passes the title to
the grantee when the condition is fully performed, without the necessity of a second
delivery by the depositary."
Craddock v Barnes, 542 N. C. 89, 96. In the same case
the court further said: "When the condition is complied with, the depositary holds the
deed for the grantee, the same as if it had been originally delivered to him as the latter's
agent, in which case the grantee would of course get the title, and could by proper
action compel an actual delivery by the depositary.' ' Citing Steamboat Co. v. Moragne,

91 Ala. 61o; zi Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2 ed.), p. 345; State Bank v Evans, 15 N. J. L.
155; Hughes v. Thistlewood, 40 Kan. 232; x6 Cyc. 588; Baum's Apepal, Tr3 Pa. St. 58.
In support of the proposition of Craddock v Barnes, that no formal delivery to the
grantee is necessary, many cases might be cited.

The following will suffice: Tombler v.

Sumpter, 97 Ark. 480; Shirley v. Ayres, 14 Ohio 307; Naylor v. Stene, 96 Minn. 57;
Davis v. Clark, 58 Kans. ioo; Grove v. Jennings, 46 Kans. 366.
" Cf. Doe d. Garnons v. Knight, j B. & C. 671, 688.
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thy. But, as no part of the consideration was paid, this was
not necessary. Mary A. Holland had the right to recall the
deed at any time before the grantees paid the money specified. Until that event, Julia McCarthy was nothing more
than a voluntary agent of the grantor to hold the deed subject to her order. Only upon the payment of the price or
some part thereof would the grantees have a beneficial interest sufficient to make delivery irrevocable. Prior to such
payment the delivery was nothing but an offer or proposal
which the grantor had the legal right to withdraw. Her
death terminated and revoked the offer and the authority of
subsequently to accept the
Julia McCarthy as her agent
3'
money and deliver the deed."
To hold otherwise would be to reach the rather unusual result of
a mere proposal being turned into an irrevocable offer by placing a
paper in the hands of a third party.
Somewhat closely related to CASE II and yet quite different in
the essence of the situation are cases of the type of Hoig v. Adrian
College.. There, to carry out a gift, a deed of land was prepared
by the owner and placed in the custody of a third party to be delivered to the grantee on the deed being signed by the grantor's
wife and a mortgage prepared and executed by the grantee. The
grantor died before these conditions were performed. At the suit
of the heirs of the grantor to have the deed set aside the court held
there had never been a delivery. The deed was never out of the
control of the grantor, the court considering that the mortgage was
to be executed to his satisfaction. Further orders, then, were needed before the custodian was to be authorized to turn over to or
hold the deed for the donee. The court said:
"Being a voluntary conveyance, without consideration, the
grantor was at liberty at any time to withdraw the deed from
the possession of the custodian, and the grantee could have
no just cause to complain. The grantor was under no legal
obligation to complete the donation. * * *"
"It is not sufficient he may have agreed to deliver the deed,
to perfect the donation. On refusal a court of equity would
not compel a specific performance. Until it was actually delivered to the donee, the locus poenitentiae existed, no matter
in whose hands the deed was. Whatever authority the custodian may have had, it ceased with the death of the donor.
No delivery could rightfully be made after his death."
Supra, p. 576.
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This is one of the cases, it should be noted, which, as stated
above, have been frequently referred to as authority for the doctrine that a contract is essential for a binding escrow.
That the Hoig case was correctly decided there can be no doubt,
for something remained to be done by the grantor. If that element
were out of the case, there might be room for a difference of opinion. Such situation will be referred to later on.
As to CASE III. Under the doctrine of the courts above referred to following Campbell v. Thomas the answer is clear to the effect that B cannot prevail. A could require X at any time, at least
before performance has begun, to return the instrument, and the
death of A would revoke any authority that X might otherwise
have to make delivery. According to these cases the situation presented in CASE III is essentially the same as in CASE II, and the
relationship between A and X is that of principal and agent. If, as
to the deed, that is really the relationship, then those decisions are
unassailable. If, on the other hand, the deed is deemed, as in CASE
I, to have passed beyond the control of A, then it is equally clear
that those cases are wrong. The question fundamentally, it is
submitted, is not the enforcement of a contract specifically or otherwise, but is one of delivery, and that very largely depends upon the
matter of intent.
Delivery is the required manifestation of intention that the transaction, as to the one making the delivery, is a completed legal act.3 T
Conceivably the law might have been satisfied with the signing or
the sealing as evidencing a completed legal act. As to the sort of
instruments under consideration, however, the law did not stop with
such acts, that additional something called delivery was required.
What will amount to such a sufficient manifestation of intention is
an extremely difficult question at times, and no adequate discussion
of that general problem can be attempted here. It will suffice to
say in the oft-quoted language of the TouCHSTONES

"that delivery

is either actual, i. e. by doing something and saying nothing, or
else verbal, i. e. by saying something and doing nothing, or it may
be by both."
Deliveries may be either absolute or conditional. In the former
the deed or other instrument is operative presently; in the latter its
operation is postponed until the performance of some condition or
See also Seifert v. Lanz, supra (15o N. W. s68, 570).
37See Wignore on Evidence, section 2404 et seq.

-

:- At p. 57.
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perhaps the happening of some event. But the vital element in any
delivery, absolute or conditional, is that the maker of the instrument somehow sufficiently evince his intention that the instrument
as to him is a completed legal act, that there is nothing left for hil
to do. In the case of absolute delivery such intention is shown normally by a manual transfer of the instrument from the maker to the
one to take thereunder or to someone on his behalf. Such manual
transfer, however, is by no means absolutely essential. As to conditional deliveries, the most common form of which is usually resays:
ferred to as delivery in escrow T~a ToucHsToNo

"And so also a deed may be delivered to the party himself
to whom it is made, or to any other by sufficient authority
from him: or it may be delivered to any stranger for, and
in the behalf, and to the use of, him to whom it is made.
without authority. But if it be delivered to a stranger without any such declaration, intention, or intimation, unless it
be in case where it is delivered as an escrow, it seems this is
not a sufficient delivery. * * *
"The delivery of a deed as an escrow is said to be where
one doth make and seal a deed and deliver it unto a stranger
until certain conditions be performed and then to be delivered to him to whom the deed is made, to take effect as his
deed. And so a man may deliver a deed, and such a delivery is good. But in this case two cautions must be heeded.
i. That the form of words used in the delivery of a deed
in this manner be apt and proper. 2. That the deed be delivered to one that is a stranger to it, and not to the party
40
himself to whom it is made."
More and more courts are coming to determine this matter of
intention in terms of control "over the deed" or other instrument.
4
In the leading case of Doe d. Garnons v. Knight, ' where the question was whether a deed of Wynne to Garnons left in the hands of
Wynne's sister had been delivered the court said that if the handing of the deed to the sister was a departing "of the power and
control over the deed for the benefit of Mr. Garnons" the delivery
would be good; "but if it was delivered to the sister for safe cus3"Some authorities take the position that if a deed is delivered to a third party to
be delivered to the grantee on the happening of an event which is certain to happen
sometime, as the death of the grantor, the deed is fully operative as a conveyance to the
grantee at once. See infra.
58.
c7,
' PP.
C. 671 (1826).
415 B3. &
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tody only for Mr. Wynne, and to be subject to his future control
and disposition, it was not a good delivery." In Prutsman v. Baker 2
the court said:
"To constitute delivery good for any purpose, the grantor
must divest himself of all power and dominion over the deed.
To do this he must part with the possession of the deed and
all right and authority to control it, either finally and forever, as where it is given over to the grantee himself, or to
some person for him, which is called an absolute delivery;
or otherwise he must part with all present or temporary right
of possession and control until the happening of some future
event or the performance of some future condition, upon
the happening or not happening, or performance or nonperformance of which, his right of possession may return
and his dominion and power over the deed be restored; in
which case the delivery is said to be contingent or conditional. An essential, characteristic, and indispensable feature of every delivery, whether absolute or conditional, is
that there must be a parting with the possession, and of the
power and control over the deed by the grantor for the benefit of the grantee, at the time of the delivery. Porter v.
Woodhouse, 59 Conn. 568; Baker v. Haskell, 47 N. H. 479."
Many other cases might be referred to in which delivery was
determined by consideration of the question as to whether the grantor bad parted with all control.4" Difficulty may well arise in this
connection by confusing physical power or control with legal right
or privilege over the disposition of the instrument, or, in other
words, with legal power over the operation thereof. One may very
well have the fullest physical power or control over a deed and yet
have absolutely no legal right or privilege to deal therewith, except
for the benefit of the grantee.
In a case such as the one under consideration the temptation is to say simply that A, the grantor, could call off the transaction and recall the deed before performance on the other side because the deed had not been delivered and therefore had not passed
beyond his control. In other words, the deed is not out of the
grantor's control because not delivered, and it is not delivered because still subject to directions of the grantor. It would, of course,
be equally convincing to say that the grantor may not revoke the
4230 Wis 644.
43 Johnson v. Johnson, 24 R. I. 571; Bury v. Young, 98 Cal. 446; Moore v. Trott,
756 Cal. 353; Munro v. Bowles, 187 111 346; Burk v. Sproat, 96 Mich. 404; Williams
v. Schatz, 42 Oh. St. 47. These are only a few of the many cases.
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transaction and recover the deed because there has been a delivery
because in turn the deed has passed out of his power.
When a deed is made out and left with a third party to be delivered sometime in the future to the grantee, control thereof may be
retained by the grantor by virtue of the terms of the arrangement
between him and the custodian. This is true even though such
arrangement is contrary to the terms of a contract between grantor and grantee.4 4 So we may at once dismiss those cases where
there is such a provision in the instructions to the custodial. In
such cases obviously there can be no binding escrow, and after recall of the deed the grantee would be without remedy unless he. has
an enforceable contract upon which to base an action.
The right to recall and control the deed may exist, however, even
in situations where there has been no such express provision. If
the relationship between depositor and depositary as to the holding and handling of the deed can fairly be said, in view of all the
circumstances, to amount to that of principal and agent, then clearly
there is a right of control left in the maker of the instrument. It is believed that in situations such as suggested above as CASE II it is
not at all unreasonable to construe the relationship between A and
X as that of principal and agent. There something remained to be
done, and, as pointed out by the California court in Holland v. McCarthy,45 the transaction on the part of A amounted only to an
offer, and X was only an agent of A to carry out the deal if the
offer should be accepted.
In CASE I where the deposit was made pursuant to an enforceable contract between A and B it is agreed that A had no control
left. It is submitted that the reason why he had no such control
left was not because he was bound by a contract but because he had
left the deed with X for B and there was nothing in the circumstances to cause X to be looked upon as an agent of A. He expressed his intent that upon the performance of a condition the
deed should be operative.
Is there any more reason for considering X the agent of A in
CASE III where there is a contract but it is unenforceable by action? No control was reserved by the terms of the deposit, so A's
ability to determine the course of the deed, if he has any, must depend upon the relationship between him and X. Here the parties'
minds had met, the deal was closed, and there was a contract, pursuant to which the deposit with X was made. Is there any sound
"This was the situation in Stanton v. Miller, supra.
" Supra.
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basis for saying that X held for A, or subject to his orders simply
because here A could break his contract with B without suffering
quite the same penalties for so doing as in CASE I? Has a party
any more "right to break" a contract unenforceable by reason of
the Statute of Frauds than he has to break one that comples with
4
the Statute ?
It would seem clear, then, that in a case where the deed is deposited pursuant to a contract unenforceable though it may h2, 'here
has been the requisite yielding up of control to constitute delivery.
There being a delivery, a completed legal act, so far as the grantor
is concerned, has been accomplished, and as to him there can be no
longer any question of enforceability of a contract or of the Statute
of Frauds. It is believed that the court in Campbell v. Thomas and
the other courts following the doctrine there laid down have wholly
failed to appreciate the nature of the problem involved, and the
operation of conditional delivery. Those cases, it is submitted,
were incorrectly decided.47
After the grantor has sufficiently manifested his intention that
the deed is as to him a completed legal act the result would seem
to be, in the language of Professor Hohfeld, that "the grantee has
an irrevocable power to divest that title (in the grantor) by performance of certain conditions

*

* , and consequently to vest

title in himself, while such power is outstanding, the grantor is, of
course, subject to a correlative liability to have his title divested. ' 48
11This of course would be inapplicable where the oral contract is not merely unenforceable but void. And it must not be forgotten that Campbell v. Thomas, the basis of
the requirement that there be an enfroceable contract, was decided in a state where the statute of frauds declares oral contracts for the sale of land ,oid. Judge Lyon in that case
spoke of the oral contract as a "nullity". See note -. supra.
4 It may very well be true that lack of control over a deed deposited with a third
party to take effect on the performance of a condition may be shown very satisfactorily
by proving that such deposit was made pursuant lo an enforceable contract with the
grantee; but that it is the only way of showing such yielding up of control, as laid down
in Campbell v. Thomas is, it is submitted, wholly erroneous.
In Farley v. Palmer. 2o Oh. St. 223. although the case might well have been disposed
of on another ground, there is a very nice instance of the working out of the correct
doctrine. Palmer and wife had contracted to sell and convey her land to Farley, and a
deed signed, etc. by Palmer and wife had been executed and deposited in escrow to
await the payment of the purchase price. Upon refusal by Farley to perform, Palmer
and wife sued Farley to compel him to pay the price. He defended on the ground that
since Mrs. Palmer as a married woman was not bound by the contract he could not be
compelled to perform. The court, however, rejected this contention, holding that Mrs.
Palmer had already performed, by the deposit in escrow, that she had no power to revoke
the deed, and that upon performance by Farley the title would have vested in him ipso
facto without further delivery. See also Davis v Clark, 58 Kans. 100 (1897); Grove v.
Jennings, 46 Kans. 66 (s89r).
0sFundamental Legal Conceptions, 23 Yale L. Jour. 16, 48. This view of the situation is very helpful in working out the position of intervening third parties.
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Other reasons for disapproving of the rule of Campbell v. Thomas have been expressed. Professor Tiffany has had the following
to say:
"The view referred to (that expressed in Campbell v.
Thomas) has no considerations of policy or convenience in
its favor, and its necessary result is consderably to detract
from the practical utility of the doctrine of conditional delivery. One objection to such a view would seem to lie in
the fact that the doctrine of conditional delivery is ont peculiar to conveyances of land, but is recognized also in connection with contracts under seal 9 and also bills and notes. If
there can be no conditional delivery of a conveyance in the
absence of a contract of sale, that is, a contract to execute a
conveyance, it would seem a reasonable inference that there
can be no conditional delivery of a contract under seal or a
promissory note unless there is a contract to execute such an
instrument. There is no more reason for requiring an auxiliary contract in the one case than in the others. Yet it has
never been suggested, so far as the writer knows, that there
can be a conditional delivery of a contract under seal or a
promissory note only when there is a legally valid contract
to execute the contract or note. Another consideration adverse to the view referred to lies in the fact that, while the
doctrine of deiivery in escrow was recognized at least as
early as the first half of the fifteenth century (see Y. B.
13 HEN. IV, 8; Y. B. 8 HEN. VI, 26; Y. B. io HEN.
VI, 25), a purely executory contract, not under seal, was not
then enforceable either in the common law courts, or, it appears, in chancery. That being the case, the requirements of
an extraneous contract in order to make the delivery in escrow effective would, in the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries,
have necessitated a contract under seal, and it seems hardly
probable that such a delivery of an obligation or conveyance
under seal was always accompanied by another obligation
under seal calling for its execution. The subject of delivery
in escrow is treated with considerable fullness in at least
two of *the earlier books (PERKINS, CONVEYANClNG, Sec.
138 -144; SHEPPARDS THE TOUCHSTONE, 58, 59), and there
"See Naylor v. Stene, 96 Minn. 57 (io5), where the instrument deposited in escrow
was itself a contract of sale of land. Before performance of the condition the vendor
notified
the custodian that the contract should not be given to the vendee. The court
held. however, that immediately upon performance of the condition the contract became
binding. Cf. King v. Upper, 57 Wash. j3.
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is not the slightest suggestion in either as to the necessity of
such an auxiliary contract. It is, to say the least, somewhat
extraordinary that an integral element in a doctrine dating
from the commencement of the fifteenth century should
5°
have remained to be discovered by a California court in
the latter half of the nineteenth."'"
In Campbell v. Thomas it was pointed out on behalf of the grantee that there are a great many cases in which courts have held
deeds left with a third party to be delivered to the grantees therein upon the death of the grantor, or some other event certain to
occur in the future, were beyond the control of the grantor. The
court recognized such cases as sound, providing the deposit of the
deed is made without any provision for recall or control, and distinguished them on the ground that there "the first delivery of the deed
passes to the grantee the title to the land, and thus relieves him
of the obligation to make title through any contract other than that
expressed in the deed itself. If it is true that in such cases there
is at once an absolute conveyance in praesenti,the distinction drawn
is obviously sound. While many cases may be found in which it is
said that the "first delivery" passes the title to the grantee, 2 sometimes with the qualification or addition that a life estate somehow
has been reserved to the grantor,55 the most carefully considered
cases are to the effect that the grantor is not divested of his ownership until the happening of the event specified.54 In such cases the
proper view would seem to be that there has been an inchoate delivery complete so far as the grantor is concerned, in other words a
cOProfessor Tiffany considers Fitch v. Bunch as the originator of the requirement
that there be an enforceable contract. In this I'think he is in error. That case did
not go nearly so far either in its decision or language.
"',Conditional Delivery of Deeds", 14 Col. L. Rev. 380. 399-400.
OWheelwright v. Wheelwright, 2 Mass 447; Brown v. Westerfield, 47 Neb. 399.
See 26 Harv. L. Rev. 576-579.
"Bury v. Young, 98 Cal. 446; Grilley v. Atkins, 78 Conn. 38o; Meech v. Wilder,
130 Mich. 29; Arnegaard v. Arnegaard, 7 N. D. 475; Maxwell v. Harper, Sr Wash. 351.
How a life estate in the grantor can be created by a juggling of delivery is a question
never adequately answered.
"In Stone v. Duvall, 77 Ill 475, where the grantee died before the grantor and the
latter endeavored to have the deed cancelled, it was held that the deed, though beyond
the grantor's power to recall, would not be operative as a conveyance until the death
of the grantor, and that in the meantime the grantor was the owner and entitled to use
the land as though he had a life estate. Stonehill v. Hastings, 2o2 N. Y. I1s, is another
clear ruling that until the happening of the event the grantor remains the owner.
Although the courts not inferquently say that in such cases as-are now under consideration the deed when handed to the custodian is the grantor's deed "presently", probably nothing more is meant than that after such delivery the grantor cannot plead non
est factum, a conclusion, even, if sound, which falls far short of a holding that the deed
is then fully operative as a conveyance investing the grantee with ownership. See
Foster v. Mansfield, 3 Met. 412.
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manifestation of intention that as to him the deed shall be taken as
a completed legal act, the full operation of which as a conveyance,
however, is to be postponed until the happening of the event, as in
cases of true escrows the full operation of a deed completely executorder to carry out the intention,
ed by the grantor is postponed, in
55
until the condition is performed.
There is another type of case which perhaps should be referred
to. Suppose A promises B to convey land to him as a gift at suci
time as B may perform some act or comply with a certain condition, and a deed is made by A and deposited with X with instructions to deliver to B on the happening of the event. This is similar
5
Such a situation is
to Hoig v. Adrian College, referred to above.
like the cases just discussed in that on the part of the grantor the
conveyance is a pure donation, it is like the escrow cases in that
something is to be done by the grantee before the conveyance is to
be effective. What would be B's situation here if A, before the performance of the condition were to attempt to recall the deed? Since
by the terms of the deposit with X no control or right to recall was
reserved by A, the only basis on which he should be allowed to retake the deed would be that in view of all the circumstances it could
be said that X held as A's representative, as his agent. In view of
the apparent disinclination on the part of some courts to render assistance in completing a pure donation it would not be surprising if
X were to be looked upon as holding for A, that a locus penitentiae
remained until final delivery. Courts in such situation would also
be very ready to consider that the act to be performed by B should
be done to the satisfaction of A, thus affording a basis for treating
the deed in the hands of X as still subject to As control. The court
so treated the arrangement in Hoig v. Adrian College. Although
such case need not necessarily be deemed to fall within the class of
cases. stated above as CASE II, there are, no doubt, considerations
which would tend to cause a court to treat it as governed by the
same principles.57
' The situation of intervening third parties claiming through the grantor would seem
to be essentially the same as in the cases of true escrows. If the deed has been delivered,
that is, wholly without the grantor's control, he of course cannot call off the transaction
directly by countermanding the instructions to the custodian. It surely should not be
any more within his power to call it off in whole or in part indirectly by marrying, or
making a will, or incurring debts, or giving the land to another. If the third party
is to be in position to claim right's superior to the grantee he must be more than a mere
successor to the position of the grantor. If the wife, or creditor, or grantee of such
grantor can be said to be an innocent purchaser for value, then there is some basis for
declaring the earlier deed as to them ineffective.
e8 So in Bosea v. Lent, supra.
ITCf. Brown v. Allbright, ito Ark. 394.
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Having seen the answer that should be given to the inquiry as to
whether an enforceable contract is essential to a binding, effective
escrow, it remains to answer the other question, whether any contract at all is necessary. Perhaps sufficient has already been said to
(i) Where a deed is placed with a third party, completely out
indicate what is believed should be the reply.
of the grantor's control, to be delivered to the grantee upon the
happening of a certain event, as the death of the grantor, no contract at all is necessary. All courts agree as to this. And it is not
a sufficient explanation to say, as said by the Wisconsin court, that
the contract is unnecessary because the deed is completely operative
as a present conveyance. That upon such delivery to the custodian
the deed is as to the grantor a completed legal act is quite true, but
that it is then operative to invest the grantee with ownership is, it is
submitted, not true.
(2) Where the event upion which the deed is to be operative as
a conveyance depends upon some act of the grantee but not in the
nature of a return for the conveyance, there is no reason why the
result should differ from that just indicated.
(3)
If something is to be done by the grantee in the way of
providing a consideration for the conveyance and there has been
no understanding arrived at, it is pretty difficult to avoid treating
the deed as a mere offer, and the custodian as holding it as the
grantor's representative. Proof of a contract should negative the
idea of a mere offer or an agency. But a mutual understanding not
amounting to a contract should have the same result. And although a case not likely to arise, might not the terms of deposit
agreed upon between the grantor and custodian be so definite and
explicit that even in the absence of such an understanding a court
could not but conclude that the grantor had completely divested himself of all control over the operation of the deed? that
the custodian was not holding the deed as the grantor's representative ?
Law School, University of Michigan.
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